In accordance with this note's recommendation, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision and held that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration did not have to issue an environmental assessment for proposed rules concerning Mexican motor carriers' safety regulation. 3 In determining that neither the National Environmental Policy Act nor the Clean Air Act necessitated the claimed environmental analysis, the Court recognized the President's inherent authority to lift a trade moratorium held to violate the North American Free Trade Agreement. 4 This note provides several considerations and recommendations for the Supreme Court in ruling on the delicate balancing INTRODUCTION Man's mind, once stretched by a new idea, never regains its original dimensions. 5 Such it is with international trade. What was once a world divided into separate and distinct cultures has now become a globe where borders continually fade and cease to exist. Although this progress brings new opportunities to many, it similarly awakens emotions of apprehension and uncertainty, while creating clashes between what was known and what is yet to be discovered. A recent Ninth Circuit case, Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 6 illuminated inconsistencies that may occur when transnational interactions attempt to fit into our previously ethnocentric societies. The discrepancy brought to light through this decision concerned a claimed conflict between an international arbitration decision under the North American Free Trade Agreement 7 (hereinafter "NAFTA") and United States environmental law.
The arbitration proceeding in question began when Mexico became frustrated with the United States' refusal to open its borders to Mexican trucks, causing the Mexican government to initiate dispute resolution proceedings under NAFTA. 8 Following the arbitral panel's decision in favor of Mexico, 9 U.S. President George W. Bush lifted the blocking moratorium and allowed Mexican carriers access to United States roads.
10 A well-known citizens' rights organization, Public Citizen, challenged this action, arguing that opening the border without conducting an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS") analysis violated fundamental U.S. environmental policies. 11 The Ninth Circuit held that the preparation of an EIS was necessary before the moratorium could be lifted. 12 The Supreme Court recently granted the government's petition for a writ of certiorari. 13 In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the United States Supreme Court will be faced with a clash between two areas of substantive law: international treaty law and national environmental law. Did the Ninth Circuit decision correctly apply United States environmental law, or did it improperly interfere with the resolution of a NAFTA trade dispute? How should the Supreme Court address the issues presented and balance the seeming inconsistency? This note will address the question of how the relationship between national and international law, as well as treaty and environmental law, will affect the Supreme Court's decision in Public Citizen. Part I gives a brief history of relevant environmental law and NAFTA, as well as the treaty's connection to the situation at hand and guidelines for NAFTA Chapter Twenty dispute resolution proceedings. Part II provides details concerning the arbitral panel's ruling and the Public Citizen case itself. Part III discusses whether the Ninth Circuit properly utilized U.S. environmental law, while Part IV examines the international implications of potential outcomes. The manner in which the Supreme Court handles the connection between these two legal fields will not only set United States precedent for dealing with future inconsistencies encountered in international trade, but will also impact and change the lives of many U.S. and Mexican citizens.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Legal Foundations
On January 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA") into law.
14 This statutory scheme signaled the first nationwide comprehensive approach to regulating the interaction between United States citizens and their environment. 15 Several environmental predicaments fostered NEPA during the 1960s, reflecting Congressional conviction that "our Nation's present state of knowledge, our established public policies, and our existing governmental institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing environmental problems 16 and crises the Nation faces." 16 The declared purpose of NEPA may be found in the statute's first section:
The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. 17 To reach these goals, Congress proceeded to impose extensive procedural requirements on governmental action affecting the environment and resolved to implement them "to the fullest extent possible." 18 Even so, this note will demonstrate how the broad goals of NEPA have led to questions of exact interpretation.
The well-recognized Clean Air Act 19 (hereinafter "CAA") of 1970 is a mere amendment to the original federal air-quality legislation, dating back to the 1950s.
20
Congress again altered the CAA in 1977 to give it furtherreaching implications. 21 These amendments mandated national air-quality standards and deadlines for their attainment, as well as created an innovative federal-state partnership structure through which states developed individual "implementation plans."
22
These "road maps" aided states in attaining compliance with federal standards overseen by the newly created Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA"). 23 NAFTA purports to "CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation" while "STRENGTHENING the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations." 27 NAFTA explicitly permits the individual nations to adopt or maintain:
standards-related measures, including any such measure relating to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers . . . including those to prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision of a service by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply with the applicable requirements of those measures or to complete the Party's approval procedures.
28
Congress similarly made it clear that NAFTA could not be construed "to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law regarding . . . the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health [or] the protection of the environment." 29 This specific provision sparked the current contentions of those individuals and organizations advocating for truck entry barriers.
Generally, foreign trucks are permitted to enter the U.S. only if authorized to do so. 30 The Department of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT") is required to grant permission to any carrier that is "willing and able to comply with" mandatory statutes and regulations. 31 However, in 1982, Congress enacted the Bus Regulatory Reform Act that imposed a two-year moratorium on the entry of motor carriers domiciled in a "contiguous foreign country," such as Mexico. 32 Due to repeated presidential orders of renewal, the moratorium remained in place until September 19, 1996. 33 Prior to the completion of the last two-year extension, Congress enacted the ICC Termination Act of 1995. If a consultation fails to resolve the disagreement within the designated time frame (usually thirty days), the complaining Party is permitted to seek good offices, conciliation, or mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.
57 Thirty days afterward, or after "such other period as the consulting Parties may agree," either Party is allowed to request the convening of an arbitration panel.
58
NAFTA states that the appointed panel will provide the disputing Parties with an initial report, findings of fact, a determination of the legal issues, and recommendations for resolution of the issues in question. 59 Interestingly, the panel's determination "is not automatically applicable to resolve the dispute."
60 Instead, the "disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform to the determinations and recommendations of the panel." 61 Thus, some scholars criticize NAFTA's dispute resolution process as being more of a "recommendation" that falls "short of authoritatively resolving the dispute."
62 Others state the panel is merely a "political troubleshooting institution rather than [an] independent arbitral body." 63 However, these stated condemnations are misleading. The Parties' failure to implement the arbitral report may produce "prompt and serious consequences." 64 After the arbitrators present their final report to the Parties, the Parties "shall agree on the resolution of the dispute." 65 The word "shall" has been interpreted to mean compliance is mandatory. 66 If the Parties cannot agree on a resolution within thirty days after receiving the panel report, then the injured Party has the right to retaliate against the Party violating NAFTA transportation. 72 This summary focuses on the first of these contentions, under Chapter Twelve, as did the actual decision.
Mexico brought the above allegations before the tribunal, contending the U.S. breached its obligations under NAFTA when it failed to phase out restrictions on cross-border trucking services. 73 Mexico maintained that U.S. commitments in Annex I of NAFTA, and its affording national treatment to Canada, required the requested discipline. 74 In response, the U.S. argued Mexico did not uphold the same rigorous standards as the regulatory systems established in the United States and Canada. 75 Thus, the "in like circumstances" language in Articles 1202 and 1203 meant the Mexican service providers could be treated differently in order to address a legitimate regulatory objective.
76
NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994.
77 Annex I of the agreement obligated the Parties to phase-out certain reservations to Articles 1102, 1202, 1103, and 1203.
78 With respect to cross-border trucking, Annex I provided that a Mexican national would be able to obtain authority to provide services in border states three years after NAFTA's signing (December 18, 1995) and cross-border trucking services throughout the United States six years after NAFTA's entry into force (January 1, 2000). 79 However, on December 18, 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation issued a press release stating Mexican applications would be accepted, but not finalized until Mexico improved its truck safety standards. 80 This refusal continued the moratorium on Mexican trucks that had been in place prior to 1995.
81
As of July 20, 1999, the DOT had received 184 applications from Mexican persons seeking permission to provide cross-border cargo services into the southwestern states. 82 Mexico and the U.S. agreed that the Mexican domestic regulatory system was not identical to that in the United States. However, the two countries disputed whether the differences seen in the structures justified the U.S. ban on Mexican trucks.
84
Consequently, the arbitral panel can be seen as focusing on determining the requisite action for the Parties under the national treatment and most-favored-nation clauses of NAFTA, modified through Annex I reservations. The panel also considered relevant exceptions to NAFTA that might validate the United States' above position. 85 Nevertheless, the arbitral group "decline[d] to examine the motivation for the U.S. decision to continue the moratorium on cross-border trucking services" and "confine[d] its analysis to the consistency or inconsistency of that action with NAFTA."
86 Interestingly, this method was fully in line with WTO Appellate Body practices. 87 The panelists first examined NAFTA's objectives and goals found in Article 102(1). 88 They also acknowledged that Article 102(2) provided a mandatory standard for the interpretation of the treaty's detailed provisions: 93 Both the United States and Mexico agreed the Convention was appropriate for the stated purpose. 94 The fundamental principle of the Convention is Article 31(1), which states in part: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 95 of its object and purpose." 95 Thus, the arbitral group interpreted the disputed treaty provisions with the understanding that the Parties accepted the binding nature of NAFTA and the obligation to perform its requirements in good faith. 96 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention directed the panel not to examine national law, but instead to look to the applicable international law; therefore, the panel utilized neither the internal law of the United States nor Mexico for NAFTA interpretation. 97 The panel first held the Annex I reservation deadlines were unambiguous, based on the ordinary meaning of the words. 98 Thus, the U.S. should have complied with the original December deadline, barring any additional agreements or conditional elements relating to NAFTA. 99 Similarly, the panelists recognized that NAFTA's negotiators carefully considered the "character, purpose, mode of preparation and adoption of reservations and their Phase-Out liberalization commitments." 100 Accordingly, the phase-out obligations of the U.S. through Annex I must prevail unless there is another provision in NAFTA that supercedes the aforementioned duties. 101 The panel then turned to this question.
102
The disagreement between the United States and Mexico could be viewed as resting on the interpretation of the phrase "in like circumstances" found in both Articles 1202 and 1203. 103 If read correctly, this language might enable the U.S. to deny access to all Mexican trucking firms on a blanket basis, regardless of the individual qualifications of particular industry members, until Mexico's own domestic regulatory system meets U.S. approval. 104 If the words are not construed in this manner, the U.S. actions would be viewed as a de jure violation of Article 1202's national treatment obligation. 105 the drafters intended the "in like circumstances" language to permit a significant trade barrier. 106 Moreover, a broad interpretation of these words would render the national treatment and most-favored nation provisions of the treaty inconsequential. 107 Under Article 2101, safety measures adopted by a Party (such as a moratorium) might be justified only to the extent they are "necessary to secure compliance" with laws or regulations otherwise consistent with NAFTA.
108
The panel employed the GATT/WTO jurisprudence to aid in determining the correct definition of "necessary."
109 As a result, the arbitrators agreed with Mexico and stated that any Party-created moratorium must secure compliance with another law or regulation that does not discriminate and must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably disguise a restriction on trade. 110 The of the moratorium. 116 The panel recommended the U.S. take appropriate steps to bring its cross-border trucking service practices into compliance with its NAFTA obligations.
117
B. Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation
In Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, a citizens' rights group challenged the government's failure to conduct the requisite environmental analysis prior to promulgating the three aforementioned regulations regarding the moratorium. 118 The plaintiff, Public Citizen, claimed the DOT's lack of preparing an in-depth EIS for all three laws violated NEPA.
119 Similarly, the plaintiff maintained the agency's failure to conduct a "conformity determination" to ensure the regulations did not disrupt applicable State Implementation Plans violated the CAA.
120
This suit stemmed from the growing concern among southern U.S. residents that increased Mexican truck traffic would substantially disrupt their environment and lifestyle.
121 As a result, Public Citizen brought this case to ensure the moratorium remained in full force until certain environmental investigations occurred and were sufficiently evaluated.
122
The case was brought immediately before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 123 The court began its analysis with a lengthy discussion justifying Public Citizen's standing to sue according to Article Further, "neither the validity of nor the United States' compliance with NAFTA" was before the court. 130 The judges instead narrowed their investigation to "the adequacy of the environmental analyses conduct by DOT before promulgating the three regulations."
131
After recognizing the standard of review, 132 the opinion moved to an environmental analysis under NEPA.
133
The court held the test for determining whether the law required DOT to prepare an EIS could be viewed in two phases: (1) whether the challenged rules constituted "major" federal actions; and (2) whether the rules might significantly affect the environment. 134 The court deemed the questioned activity a "major" federal action through examination of NEPA's Council on Environmental Quality (hereinafter "CEQ") guidelines.
135 Under these instructions, a "major" federal activity contains "effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility," including the adoption of official policy, such as either a rule or regulation.
136
The court concluded the regulations in dispute had a substantial probability of causing reasonably foreseeable "indirect" effects, and, thus, met the qualification.
137
The CEQ principles similarly defined "significantly" to aid judges in resolving whether DOT regulations might affect the environment. 138 Because the CEQ indicates a proposed federal action must be analyzed in the local, regional, and national contexts, as well as through long-and short-term consequences, the court held that the DOT's analysis was inadequate. Additionally, the threat to public health and safety from added pollutants, 140 the likelihood of uncertainty in deducing exact environmental impacts, 141 the prospective risk of violating high state-established standards, 142 and the extensive controversy surrounding the likelihood of these factors 143 led the court to rule the questioned regulations might "significantly" affect the environment. 144 Finally, the court concluded the DOT acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" in failing to conduct any NEPA environmental analysis for the Certification Rule. 145 The next step in the court's reasoning turned to language under the CAA. The court looked to terminology stating the CAA contains a "conformity" requirement, prohibiting an agency or department of the Federal Government from engaging in, supporting, or providing financial assistance for, licensing or permitting, or approving any activity that did not conform to a State Implementation Plan. 146 According to the court, because the DOT failed to conduct a reliable environmental analysis, there was no guarantee the regulations would not result in emission amounts excessive to CAA requirements. 147 Proper CAA scrutiny should take place at the local and regional level, not the national one.
148 Using a "but-for" analysis suggested by EPA standards, the court lastly stated the EPA did not intend to omit all federal regulations from the scope of this constraint.
149
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the importance of United States compliance with its treaty obligations to Mexico, it stated that such acquiescence could not arise at the cost of violating established U.S. law. 150 Consequently, the court granted Public Citizen's petitions and remanded the matter to the DOT to prepare an EIS and CAA conformity determination for all three regulations. 151 
III. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As has been observed, the NAFTA arbitration panel and Ninth Circuit decisions come down on opposite sides of the spectrum regarding this controversy. The relationship between the relevant treaty and environmental law will certainly influence the Supreme Court's ruling on the Public Citizen case. The method in which the Court manages the connection between these two decisions will set national precedent for dealing with international trade inconsistencies. How the line should be drawn, however, poses important considerations. This note will first examine whether or not the Ninth Circuit correctly applied U.S. environmental law. The manner in which the Supreme Court interprets these relevant statutes will prove paramount and pivotal in reaching an ultimate conclusion. Depending on questions of interpretation, the Court may either avoid the inconsistency and delicate balancing altogether, or confront it head-on.
A. Presidential Constitutional Authority
The President's direct action in lifting the moratorium began the chain reaction that led to the Public Citizen suit. When examining the duties accorded to the President and the other two branches of government, the U.S. Constitution provides a solid starting point. A President exercises foreignaffairs powers through his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 153 his ability to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," 154 and by "tak [ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 155 The Supreme Court has defined the person holding this office as the "guiding organ in the conduct of our foreign affairs," in whom the Constitution bestows "vast powers in relation to the outside world." 156 There is an intermingling of the legislative foreign-commerce power and the executive foreign-affairs power to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing and eventually eliminating trade barriers across the world. NAFTA was an elementary, but indispensable, first step toward achieving a free-trade area between the North American countries and enabling them to better compete in a global marketplace. In fact, the same fast track Presidential authority that enabled NAFTA to be initially implemented "has been the key procedural linchpin of U.S. trade policy since 1974." 161 The aforementioned information illustrates that the Presidential powers questioned in this scenario are well-characterized in United States law.
B. NEPA Applicability
This case is not the first time Public Citizen attempted to prevent the implementation of NAFTA. In 1991, the group formally filed a lawsuit to compel the United States Trade Representative (hereinafter "USTR") to issue an EIS on NAFTA itself. 162 After NAFTA entered into effect in 1992, Public Citizen went back to court to ask for the EIS once again. 163 Interestingly, its argument in this second suit noted that NEPA did not apply to the President, and, thus, based its case on the theory that the USTR was the responsible agency. 164 The reason Public Citizen took this angle in making its argument is explained below. It is possible the Ninth Circuit made an error in holding that NEPA and the CAA render illusory the critical distinction between a constitutional Presidential action regarding foreign affairs and a subordinate federal agency's regulatory domestic conduct. In fact, the decision may actually remove Presidential discretion preserved through NEPA and the CAA. If this is true, the court's interpretation, overlooking this afforded freedom of choice, may hinder the executive branch's ability to swiftly respond to international diplomatic and economic issues. Despite the fact that the three governmental branches provide checks and balances on one another, there are instances where the leader of our nation is called upon to exercise the foreign-affairs power minus the hindrance of non-applicable agency guidelines.
As noted, the FMCSA is the Department of Transportation agency responsible for motor-carrier safety and registration. 165 The FMCSA fulfills its duties under a broad statutory mandate that permits registration for all domestic or foreign motor carriers that are "willing and able to comply with" applicable safety requirements. 166 Any carrier willing and able to abide by these rules receives the qualification. Hence, FMCSA possesses no individual authority to base registration decisions on environmental concerns or to advocate for enforcement of environmental requirements. The agency noted that in the situation at hand, "[t]he President, not the FMCSA, has [the] authority" to open the border and lift the moratorium. 167 This Presidential entitlement is provided for in both NEPA and the CAA.
Scholars argue the EIS process has served as one of the "cornerstones" of United States environmental policy for over twenty years. 168 As a result, approximately eighty-four other countries used NEPA as a model for their own environmental impact assessment analysis. 169 Nevertheless, this assertion does not alter the conclusion that under the NEPA laws of this country, the President is afforded special protection. Although NEPA applies to both economic and commercial agreements negotiated through U.S. governmental agencies, a close scrutiny reveals the law is not relevant to trade agreements made through the President. Under NEPA, federal agencies must complete a detailed EIS before undertaking what are referred to as "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 170 To assure compliance, the CEQ implements regulations defining these statutory requirements, which are "entitled to substantial deference."
171 Within these guidelines, "federal agencies" subject to NEPA do not include "the Congress, the Judiciary, or the President."
172 No "agency" makes a proposal for trade agreement legislation.
173
"The President makes the proposal, and the President is not an agency."
174 Congress chose to limit NEPA instead of expanding its range to cover a broader spectrum of issues. Consequently, the President's lifting of the moratorium falls outside the control of NEPA's EIS constraint. The Ninth Circuit decision, therefore, did not have the authority to delay the removal of the trade barrier.
The appellate court actually refused to address this issue directly.
175
Instead, it carved a path through the maze by reasoning CEQ regulations mandated FMCSA to prepare an EIS because the President's action that removed the moratorium was a "reasonably foreseeable" consequence of FMCSA's rulemakings.
176
In reaching this deduction, the court relied primarily on two CEQ provisions. The first of these states a federal agency is compelled to study not only environmental direct effects, but also "[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in the time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable."
177 This "indirect effect" argument has three principle weaknesses.
First, indirect effects that prompt an EIS must be "caused by [agency] action." 178 The effects from the President opening the border between the United States and Mexico do not fit this requirement. Instead, the executive choice resulted from compliance with a NAFTA arbitration panel's ruling. When the agency created the regulations, the President had already resolved to lift the moratorium according to the belief that it would best serve this country and our international trade relations. 179 This conviction "prompted" FMCSA to issue its safety regulations. 180 Therefore, the agency guidelines themselves did not "cause" the indirect effects in question. The Presidential pronouncement did, and, as previously noted, this decision is exempt from NEPA scrutiny.
Second, under the Ninth Circuit's rationale, a subordinate agency that participates in Presidential policy implementation is required to look at itself as the "cause" of that policy. 181 However, under the U.S. Constitution, the agency does not possess any direct control over Presidential decision-making. Appellate courts have also held agencies are not compelled to conduct NEPA reviews of "ministerial" decisions over which there is no control.
182 This qualification is directly analogous to the present situation. Here, FMCSA conducted an environmental evaluation of its own safety rules, but did not have to prepare an EIS to address the Presidential action over which it had no control.
The third flaw involves a determination that a Presidential action is subject to NEPA scrutiny. As recognized, the President is not a "federal agency"
183 and cannot fall under this type of analysis. NEPA's purpose is to "help public officials make decisions."
184 Even apart from the President's secure exemption, this goal is not served when a federal agency is required to prepare an EIS concerning a foreign-affairs decision with potentially global implications. Consequently, the NEPA EIS requirement is not a necessary step when Presidential discretion concerning international trade is involved.
The additional CEQ regulation the Ninth Circuit relied on maintains an agency EIS should address "[c]umulative actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts." 185 A "cumulative impact" is defined as an impact that "results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions" of any person. "cumulative impact" analysis when it compared before and after effects of the regulations' execution.
187
The agency did not conduct this analysis with regard to the actual decision to lift the moratorium, as Public Citizen argues should have occurred. 188 Yet, the President's choice is not an issue that falls under the "cumulative effects" examination. Instead, the border opening is a Presidential decision exempt from EIS requirements. 189 Even if the Ninth Circuit had determined an EIS might have been necessary, FMCSA should have been afforded the final discretionary decision-making capability upon remand.
190
C. CAA Applicability
Arguments brought concerning the CAA are equally questionable. Normally, under this statute, a federal "department, agency, or instrumentality" may not "engage in, support in any way or provide financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve, any activity" violating a relevant State air-quality implementation strategy. 191 As seen with NEPA, Presidential actions are not subject to this CAA conformity obligation, because the President is not considered a federal "department, agency, or instrumentality." 192 Accordingly, while the CAA requirements apply to agency-initiated regulations, a Presidentially-instigated action cannot be restricted in the same manner.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff maintained the Ninth Circuit decision is correct because Congress stated NAFTA implementation is subject to national environmental laws. 193 This contention reminded the court that while the U.S. is under the obligation to comport with its treaty obligations, the environment trumps when there is a direct conflict between treaty and environmental law. Although initially convincing, this assertion overlooks the fact that the issue presented here is whether the environmental laws mandate an EIS preparation 194 . Petition, supra note 167, at 20.
of Presidential foreign-related action, not whether those laws are applicable to NAFTA implementation as a whole. The President's decision regarding the moratorium does not change the fact that a Mexican carrier, which obtains authorization to operate within the United States, is still "subject to the same Federal and State laws, regulations, and procedures that apply to carriers domiciled in the United States . . . including those administered by . . . Federal and State environmental agencies."
194 Hence, these protections will be upheld, whether or not the trade barrier is removed. Under the current system, all Mexican trucks are barred, regardless of their compliance with these regulations. It is this scenario that the NAFTA arbitration panel deemed unacceptable, especially since Canadian trucks do not face the same dilemma.
D. Conclusion
From the above analysis, one may discern that it is entirely possible that the relationship between the national and international substantive law systems is not inconsistent at all. Instead, the Ninth Circuit merely misapplied the balancing tactics between treaty and environmental rules. Contrary to the conclusion of the court, the laws present various exceptions for Presidential action that exempt his decisions from statutory scrutiny. As a result, the arbitration panel's decision may be afforded deference, since there is no direct conflict with U.S. internal law processes. If the Supreme Court fails to take this road of reasoning and determines a conflict with U.S. environmental law does exist, it will then be faced with a strategic examination of national and international policy interests. In conducting this balancing, several concerns arise. Supreme Court would negatively impact the United States internationally is the next issue this note raises. Three areas of significance discussed in this section are:
IV. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
(1) resultant consequences of the interference with constitutionally-awarded Presidential power; (2) future implications for NAFTA; and (3) the United States' global reputation. The below analysis will introduce questions of whether the Supreme Court should perhaps overrule the Ninth Circuit, not for considerations of environmental law application, but because of larger, global concerns.
A. Potential Interference with Foreign Affairs
The Public Citizen decision may be viewed as constraining executive discretion to conduct foreign affairs in two ways. Initially, the lower court's use of NEPA and the CAA could endanger the President's capability of reacting swiftly and resolutely in the international realm. 200 The President's "complete monopoly over foreign communications" finds justification in its acceptance throughout our nation's history and in various Presidents' insistence upon it. 201 This authority is vital to ensure the smooth workings of the federal government as it interrelates with other nations in the global political realm. The "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," 202 combined with congressional delegation, is the basis for bilateral and multilateral treaty actions. As the situation at hand demonstrates, the Executive branch is often called upon to react quickly to a growing international dilemma, thus avoiding further confrontation with neighboring countries. The Constitution grants this ability to the President and entrusts it specifically to that role.
United States courts have established broad Presidential authority in the area of foreign affairs, "including the Power to conclude international accords in the form of agreements not subject to the formal treaty-ratification process." 203 The lifting of the moratorium falls directly within this category of action. Hence, neither the Constitution, nor federal statutes, required the President to proceed through a prescribed approval process when he made the decision to remove the moratorium. In Public Citizen, the conditions Congress did impose were satisfied through the FMCSA regulations by November of 2002. 204 Afterward, the President, acting within his inherent authority and with express congressional authorization, 205 removed the restriction against Mexico.
206
Public Citizen diverted this attempt at compliance, and thus interferes with afforded Constitutional authority.
Secondly, Supreme Court precedent has held that the Executive's decisions in the "sphere of international trade are reviewable only to determine whether the President's action falls within his delegated authority, whether the statutory language has been properly construed, and whether the President's action conforms with the relevant procedural requirements." 207 As a result, the plaintiffs in this case cannot block the President's proclamation from transpiring through an indirect route and challenge. "The President's findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject to review." 208 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "legislation conferring upon the President discretion to regulate foreign commerce invokes, and is reinforced and augmented by, the President's constitutional power to oversee the political side of foreign affairs." 209 These two grants of authority weigh more heavily than the requirements of agency regulations that are not designed to influence Presidential freedom. In the area of international trade, congressional authorizations of Presidential power "intimately involved" in foreign affairs "should be given a broad construction and not 'hemmed in' or 'cabined, cribbed, [or] confined' by anxious judicial blinders." 210 In agreeing to the implementation of NAFTA, the U.S. government recognized that this treaty upholds the aforementioned foundational principles. In conclusion, it may be argued that the Supreme Court should heavily weigh the manner in which this case decision could encumber Presidential authority granted through the Constitution, even to the point of sidestepping the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on environmental law.
B. Importance of NAFTA for Economic Enhancement
NAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, created to improve business transactions within North America. 211 The agreement eliminated all tariffs between the United States and Canada by 1998, and will eliminate almost all tariffs between the United States and Mexico by 2008. 212 Since its implementation, the United States' economy has grown significantly, and NAFTA has helped create fair and open markets within the participating countries. 213 NAFTA's purpose is to "bring about a sweeping change in the terms and conditions under which companies do business in Canada, Mexico and the United States." 214 It never was, nor is today, an "easy" road to travel. Relations between the diametrically different cultures have seen a confrontational past, due in large part to contradictory economic conditions and personal values. Despite the fact that Presidents who act under broad statutory authority grants have "imposed and lifted embargoes, prohibited and allowed exports, suspended and resumed 215 When former President Clinton reported NAFTA's effects to Congress in 1997, he stated that cooperation between the Administration and the Congress on a bipartisan basis has been critical in our efforts to reduce the deficit, to conclude trade agreements that level the global playing field for America, to secure peace and prosperity along America's borders, and to help prepare all Americans to benefit from expanded economic opportunities.
216
The former President even admitted that changes to United States-Mexican trade policies would most likely not have come to pass without the implementation of the treaty. 217 This factor demonstrates the often-overlooked underpinnings in play, and the strong desire held by our government to make NAFTA successful. If NAFTA is continuously challenged, and in essence rejected through the judicial system, it will have little effect in enhancing prosperity in North America.
President Bush himself stated that the new permission of Mexican truck traffic is "consistent with obligations of the United States under NAFTA and with our national transportation policy." 218 In addition, "expeditious action [was] required to implement th[e] modification to the moratorium." 219 The delay in compliance has already caused the Mexican government to implement parallel restrictions on United States' motor carrier operations and to threaten additional trade sanctions. 220 While those consequences harm U.S. businesses and consumers, the U.S.'s international character is also in significant jeopardy of being wounded if non-compliance continues.
C. Preserving the United States' International Reputation
The global reputation of the United States is necessary to validate national courses of action. The question of which individuals are responsible for preserving this status has been the source of much past controversy. To partially resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of preserving presidential discretion in foreign matters and the problematic nature of judicial interference. 221 "From all outward appearances, the President stands at the helm of our nation's foreign affairs power. He meets with leaders of other countries, negotiates international agreements, and commands our military forces." 222 The President derives this authority from the "structure of our government and national practices that have developed throughout the history of the polity that have facilitated the executive's agglomeration of power." 223 Since early in our country's history, Congress has not doubted that the President is the "sole organ of communication with foreign governments: Congress does not speak or receive communications on behalf of the United States, or negotiate with foreign governments, or 'conduct foreign relations.'" 224 In the arena of international negotiation, the President must be able to "speak for the Nation with one voice," and make decisions on behalf of the United States without a fear of repercussion through the Courts. 225 Applicable to the case at hand, fulfillment of the President's lawful obligations should not hinge on "subordinate executive officials" having not "undertaken environmental reviews of [his] actions or other matters lying outside their authority, or because a court questions whether [his] action is consistent with conclusions an agency reached in an EIS." 226 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals that has applied NEPA and the CAA to Presidential deeds.
The United States has been in a similar position before: one of attempting to justify to the international community an apparent disregard for its negotiated treaty obligations. Instead of defaulting to its transnational agreements, the U.S. has occasionally interpreted its own law in a manner so as to circumvent governmental-approved concessions. 227 Justly or unjustly, this course of action damages the country's international reputation and harms facilitation of multi-lateral trade. Two primary examples of this phenomenon are summarized below.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
228 concerned a product liability suit between an Iowan plaintiff and a French defendant. 229 While both parties initially worked under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant eventually contested requests for depositions and documents. 230 The defendant argued the language of the French blocking statute, "subject to treaties . . . ," indicated the Hague Evidence Convention must be employed.
231
The Supreme Court identified four possibilities for applicability of the Evidence Convention: (1) the Convention always applies; (2) the Convention must be used first, but not exclusively; (3) the Convention is a supplemental set of procedures for the Federal Rules that is optional under treaty law; and (4) the Convention is not ever required, but is simply an undertaking to facilitate discovery a U.S. court should use when deemed appropriate to the relevant parties' situations.
232
The majority put the third rationale into practice and held a case-by-case analysis based on comity is required in each scenario. 233 To the international community, the Court effectively overlooked U.S. obligations under the Evidence Convention.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk 234 created yet another globally unpopular Supreme Court ruling. The case involved a plaintiff whose parents were killed in a car crash. 235 The plaintiff's attorney filed suit in Illinois state court and decided to serve process on the German manufacturer defendant by delivering the documents to its U.S. wholly-owned subsidiary, in compliance with state statutes. 236 The defendant parent contested the The Court held service was proper, 238 again seemingly overlooking the relevant nature of an international agreement. Thus, even though the Convention's Article I language indicates it is "mandatory,"
239 the treaty is mandatory only when it applies, such as an occasion to transmit documents for service abroad.
240
International critics argue the United States categorically took two treaties and, through its legal system, rendered them useless. 241 The Supreme Court employed state law to "get out of" the Service Convention and made the Evidence Convention, at best, an option. The two above cases have resulted in friction between the U.S. and other treaty partners. Although the judiciary and legal scholars have justified the results of both Schlunk and Aérospatiale in a convincing manner, 242 other nations are often deaf and blind to these rationales.
It is important to remember that the Supreme Court will not be ruling on international law in the Public Citizen case, as it did with Schlunk and Aérospatiale. Nevertheless, it should heed the ramifications these cases produced, and keep these international concerns in mind when ruling on treaty and U.S. environmental law. Consequently, the Court must strongly justify its decision if it elects to uphold the Ninth Circuit ruling, as anything less could seem like another attempt to evade agreed-upon duties. A solid rationale describing why the Court chose to follow substantive environmental law, despite the obvious conflict with NAFTA obligations, would help alleviate a flashback to Schlunk and Aérospatiale. Although the President possesses the ability to negotiate matters with foreign countries, other national governments will not be willing to cooperate with the United States unless they believe commitments will be honored. 243 Congress has recognized this predicament and taken steps to remedy the situation. 244 Nevertheless, any U.S. perceived slip-up could cause a more drastic response than would originally have been expected. Analogously, if the Supreme Court utilizes national environmental law to avoid NAFTA obligations, the United States could again lose credibility in the eyes of the international community.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to suggest how the United States Supreme Court should balance the apparent inconsistency between national and international law. As has been demonstrated, perhaps there is no inconsistency at all. It is entirely possible the Court could overrule the Ninth Circuit and hold that the NAFTA arbitration decision does not conflict with U.S. environmental statutes. The laws the Ninth Circuit called into question possess exceptions permitting a U.S. President to act within his afforded powers in a manner done so here. Environmental law will also continue to be followed, as each Mexican carrier must meet the given standards before it is able to operate within the United States. Only the blanket ban will be removed. If the Court takes this path, the balancing might be presently avoided.
Nevertheless, if the High Court chooses to adopt the lower court's rationale and either refuses to address the Presidential authority issue or interprets environmental law as mandating an EIS, it should still consider the international implications of a decision in favor of re-installing the moratorium. This note raised several prospective concerns regarding barriers to the implementation of NAFTA and other transnational agreements. For many crusaders, NAFTA has become a symbol of "new-fangled internationalist entanglements that threatens to compromise our 'sovereignty.'" 245 A disregard of the arbitral decision could spur this fight against opening national borders even more, causing a retreat from the essential progress already made in global trade. The judicial system should, thus, strive to carefully examine challenges to treaty agreements. International commerce is inevitable in our future, and treaties such as NAFTA are only the beginning footprints. The Supreme Court will continue to face scenarios similar to Public Citizen in the years and decades ahead. As the realm of international trade grows, these inconsistencies will not lessen; consequently, the judiciary must establish a solid course of action as soon as possible to provide both clarity and guidance, carving a path and calibrating the scale for future balancing cases.
